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The Relevance of Realism 
Any general statement of realism, however, inevitably obscures the great variation in focus in controversies between 
realists and antirealists from antiquity to the present day. In some controversies, what is primarily at issue is a 
question of ontology, concerning the existence of entities of some problematic kind. In others, the opposition, while 
still broadly ontological in character, concerns rather the ultimate nature of reality as a whole, a historically 
important example being the controversies generated by various forms of idealism. In yet others the dispute, while 
not entirely divorced from questions of ontology, is primarily concerned with the notion of truth, either in general or 
in application to statements of some particular type, such as moraljudgments or theoretical scientific claims about 
unobservable entities.
One of the earliest and most famous realist doctrines is Plato’s theory of Forms, which asserts that things such as 
\"the Beautiful\" (or \"Beauty\") and \"the Just\" (or \"Justice\") exist over and above the particular beautiful objects 
and just acts in which they are instantiated and more or less imperfectly exemplified; the Forms themselves are 
thought of as located neither in space nor in time. Although Plato’s usual term for them (eido) is often translated in 
English as Idea, it is clear that he did not think of them as mental but rather as abstract, existing independently both 
of mental activity and of sensible particulars. As such, they lie beyond the reach of sense perception, which Plato 
regarded as providing only beliefs about appearances as opposed to knowledge of what is truly real. Indeed, the 
Forms are knowable only by the philosophically schooled intellect.
Although the interpretation of Plato’s theory remains a matter of scholarly controversy, there is no doubt that his 
promulgation of it initiated an enduring dispute about the existence of universals—often conceived, in opposition to 
particulars, as entities, such as general properties, which may be wholly present at different times and places or 
instantiated by many distinct particular objects. Plato’s pupil Aristotle reacted against the extreme realism which he 
took Plato to be endorsing: the thesis of universalia ante res (Latin: \"universals before things\"), according to which 
universals exist in their own right, prior to and independently of their instantiation by sensible particulars. He 
advocated instead a more moderate realism of universalia in rebus(\"universals in things\"): While there are 
universals, they can have no freestanding, independent existence. They exist only in the particulars that instantiate 
them.
In the medieval period, defenders of a broadly Aristotelian realism, including William of Shyreswood and Peter of 
Spain, were opposed by both nominalistsand conceptualists. Nominalists, notably William of Ockham, insisted that 
everything in the nonlinguistic world is particular. They argued that universals are merely words which have a 
general application—an application which is sufficiently explained by reference to the similarities among the 
various particulars to which the words are applied. Conceptualists agreed with the nominalists that everything is 
particular but held that words which have general application do so by virtue of standing for mental intermediaries, 
usually called general ideas or concepts.
Although medieval in origin, the latter view found its best-known implementation in the English philosopher John 
Locke’s theory of abstract ideas, so called because they are supposed to be formed from the wholly particular ideas 
supplied in experience by \"abstracting\" from their differences to leave only what is common to all of them. 
Locke’s doctrine was vigorously criticized in the 18th century by his empiricist successors, George Berkeley and 
David Hume, who argued that ideas corresponding to general words are fully determinate and particular and that 
their generality of application is achieved by making one particular idea stand indifferently as a representative of 
many.
The term \"Platonism\" has often been used, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, as an alternative to the 
correspondingly wider use of \"realism\" to denote ontological views to which such nominalism stands opposed. 
Nominalists have often recommended their rejection of abstracta on grounds of ontological economy, invoking the 
methodological maxim known as Ockham’s razor—Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem (\"Entities 
are not to be multiplied beyond necessity\"). The maxim is problematic, however, for at least two reasons. First, it 
gives a clear directive only when accompanied by some answer to the obvious question, \"Necessary for what?\" 
Although the answer—\"Necessary to account for all the (agreed upon) facts\"—is equally obvious, it is doubtful 
that there is sufficient agreement between the nominalist and the realist to enable the former to cut away abstracta as 
unnecessary. The realist is likely to suppose that the relevant facts include the facts of mathematics, which, taken at 
face value, do require the existence of numbers, sets, and so on.
The main thing happening here is a shift in the meaning of terms. Specifically, the word \"realist\" has had many 
many different uses over time. The basic idea is that a realist believes something is real, i.e. that such entities do in 
fact exist, that they are metaphysical objects in their own right (rather than existing as modalities on the mind).
Realism when used in reference to mathematical realism and Plato is that X is believes Y do in fact exist.
So Plato is a realist about Platonic Forms. Mathematical realists believe numbers do in fact exist.
Plato's view stands in contrast to Aristotle's view -- which while also realist with respect to forms does not think the 
forms exist as ideas. Instead, they exist as essences in substances. In contemporary language, this is the debate over 
universals. Anti-realist views think that these things only exist in our heads as words or concepts. (Realist views can 
of course accept that we also make words or terms for these things).
The term idealism doesn't generally occur in this debate. Idealism instead refers to views where things only exist due 
to the mind. It's a partial offshoot of rationalism generally associated with Schopenhauer. Hegel is often called an 
idealist as well, but I would argue this is a misnomer.
A strong argument against extreme realism is the third man argument which was first offered by Plato in his 
Parmenides dialogue. It runs as follows: a man is a man because he partakes in the form of ‘man’. For a form to be 
‘man’ it has to be ‘man’ itself (principle of self-predication). But for that the form ‘man’ has to partake in a third 
form of ‘man’ which explains the man-ness of both the man as a particular and the man as a form. This leads to an 
infinite regress. The third man argument is a powerful argument against Plato’s extreme realism.
According to Plato, it would continue to exist even if all red objects were to vanish from the spatio-temporal world. 
Similar to numbers, these forms are abstract, immaterial and unchanging entities; they transcend the spatio-temporal 
world.
The Realist perspective is what the both personalities have. Aristotle is known to be a critic of his teacher Plato, who 
is known to be an Idealist. Plato’s prescriptions are collectively recorded in ‘The Republic’. Aristotle’s reaction to 
the recommendations of Plato possesses an indication of disagreement that does not conform to idealist perspective. 
According to Irwin (1988, p.5), Aristotle commits to a metaphysical realist notion of what knowledge and reality is. 
This shows the Aristotelian philosophy is heavily committed to concept reality in the context of their time. 
Aristotle’s realist perspective may not be applicable to the modern day standards of realism, however his realist 
view stood out beyond his time where in the philosophers’ inclination is to idealism. Aristotle’s idea of the truth is 
the reason why he is committed with the realist perspective. \"Aristotle’s remarks about truth show his commitment 
to metaphysical realism\". (Irwin, 1988, p.5) This statement explains why the truth is an important concept in 
Aristotle’s Realist view, because it boils down to the collection facts that will be the basis of his inquiry that will 
create an objective reality. What also sets the Aristotelian realist view to the Thucydidean is its triviality.
The attempt, however, to render life as it is, to use language as a kind of undistorting mirror of, or perfectly 
transparent window to, the \"real\" is fraught with contradictions. Realism in this simplified sense must assume a 
one-to-one relationship between the signifier (the word, \"tree\" for example) and the thing it represents (the actual 
arboreal object typically found in forests). Realism must, in effect, disguise its own status as artifice, must try and 
force language into transparency through an appeal to our ideologically constructed sense of the real. The reader 
must be addressed in such a way that he or she is always, in some way, saying, \"Yes. That's it, that's how it really is.
\"
Realism can never fully offer up the world in all its complexity, its irreducible plenitude. Its verisimilitude is an 
effect achieved through the deployment of certain literary and ideological conventions which have been invested 
with a kind of truth value. The use of an omniscient narrator who gives us access to a character's thoughts, feelings 
and motivations, for example, is a highly formalized convention that produces a sense of psychological depth; the 
characters seem to have \"lives\" independent of the text itself. They, of course, do not; the sense that they do is 
achieved entirely by the fact that both the author and the reader share these codes of the real. The consensual nature 
of such codes is so deep that we forget that we are in the presence of fiction. As Terry Eagleton notes,
The sign as \"reflection,\" \"expression\" or \"representation\" denies the productivecharacter of language: it 
suppresses the fact that what we only have a \"world\" at all because we have language to signify it. (136)
The realist novel first developed in the nineteenth century and is the form we associate with the work of writers such 
as Austen, Balzac, George Eliot and Tolstoy. According to Barthes, the narrative or plot of a realist novel is 
structured around an opening enigma which throws the conventional cultural and signifying practices into disarray. 
In a detective novel, for example, the opening enigma is usually a murder, or a theft. The event throws the world 
into a paranoid state of suspicion; the reader and the protagonist can no longer trust anyone because signs--people, 
objects, words--no longer have the obvious meaning they had before the event. But the story must move inevitably 
towards closure, which in the realist novel involves some dissolution or resolution of the enigma: the murderer is 
caught, the case is solved, the hero marries the girl. The realist novel drives toward the final re-establishment of 
harmony and thus re-assures the reader that the value system of signs and cultural practices which he or she shares 
with the author is not in danger. The political affiliation of the realist novel is thus evident; in trying to show us the 
world as it is, it often reaffirms, in the last instance, the way things are.
As Catherine Belsey notes, classic realism is \"still the dominant popular mode in literature, film, and television 
drama\" (67). It has been denounced as the crudest from of the readerly text, and its conventions subverted and 
parodied by the modern novel, the new novel and postmodern novel. However, the form, like the capitalist mode of 
production with which it is historically coincident, has shown remarkable resiliency. It will no doubt continue to 
function, if only anti-thetically, as one of the chief influences on the development of hypertext fiction.
Although his fiction represented all classes of French society, Balzac was one of the first authors to focus his work 
on the lives of ordinary French citizens. He tried to depict life and society as they truly were. He used detail to great 
effect, and he was also one of the first authors to make character and psychology one of the central concerns of his 
writing. It's no wonder that he influenced a huge number of important authors, from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Marcel 
Proust.
Balzac is best known for his ‘Human Comedy,’ a collection of more than ninety novels and essays concerning 
French society in the early nineteenth century, This really cemented his reputation as a literary realist, which is what 
makes his foray into travel writing all that more fascinating.\"
This fascination with the exotic prompted Balzac to depart from his established role as novelist and embrace the 
realm of fantasy travel-writing. \"This was a departure from his usual style in another sense too, in that it was a work 
of considerable humor, almost tongue-in-cheek.\"
To the European armchair traveler of the 1830s, Java was as remote as the moon. Balzac seemed well aware of this 
as he gave free rein to his imagination. Alongside true descriptions of Java, gleaned from the real-life traveler he had 
interviewed, Balzac concocted stories of a magical land inhabited by civilized monkeys, where coconuts were in fact 
dragon eggs, and where women could conceive by being exposed to the heat of the sun.
Novelist Honoré de Balzac is generally hailed as the grandfather of literary Realism in the long series of novels and 
stories he titled La Comédie humaine (The Human Comedy), and which attempted systematically to render a portrait 
of all aspects of the France of his time from the lowest thief or prostitute to the highest aristocrat or political leader. 
The title of the series was chosen to contrast with Dante’s Divine Comedy, which had portrayed everything except 
the earthly human realm.
His attention to detail was obsessive, with long passages of description of settings being a characteristic feature of 
his work. Today readers resist such descriptive writing, but before films and television were invented, it had a 
magical effect on people, causing the world depicted to explode from the page in an almost tangible fashion. … 
[19th century readers] welcomed lengthy novels (often published serially, over a series of weeks or even months) in 
the same way we greet a satisfying television series which becomes a staple of our lives. Like such a television 
series, [Balzac’s] works also incorporated a device for maintaining his audience: the continual reappearance of 
certain characters from one work to the next – now as protagonists, now as secondary figures. The idea is an old 
one, going back to classic bodies of work such as the Homeric epics and the Medieval Arthurian romances; but it 
had a different effect in Balzac’s work: readers could recognize a slightly altered version of the world they 
themselves inhabited as they moved from story to story.
What is not realistic about Balzac’s fiction is his plots, filled with sensational conspiracies and crimes and wildly 
improbable coincidences. Balzac’s works are still essentially Romantic creations with a Realistic veneer.
Gustave Flaubert
It was Gustave Flaubert who in 1857 produced the seminal work from which later literary Realism was to flow: 
Madame Bovary. Flaubert had begun his writing career as most young authors in his time did, as a Romantic, 
laboring on a tale of Medieval mysticism which was eventually published as La Tentation de Saint Antoine (The 
Temptation of Saint Anthony). When he read an early draft of this work to some friends, they urged him to attempt 
something more down to earth. He chose the story of an adulterous woman married to an unimaginative country 
physician unable to respond to – or even comprehend – her romantic longings. Drawing on the real-life stories of 
two women – Delphine Delamare and Louise Pradier – whose experiences he was intimately familiar with, Flaubert 
labored to turn journalism into art while avoiding the romantic clichés he associated with his heroine’s fevered 
imagination.
Like Balzac, he engaged in systematic research, modeling the village in his novel on an actual country town and 
even drawing a map of it detailed enough to allow scholars to catch him when he has Emma Bovary turn in the 
wrong direction on one of her walks. Unlike Balzac, he avoided the sensational sort of plot lines characteristic of 
Romantic novels. To modern readers a married woman carrying on two adulterous affairs and then committing 
suicide may seem fairly sensational, but it is important to note that there was a long tradition of tales of female 
adultery in French literature stretching back as far as the Middle Ages. What Flaubert did with the theme was give 
adultery the shocking impact of the tabloids by stripping his tale of the high romantic idealism that usually justified 
adultery; instead he systematically satirized his heroine’s bourgeois taste for exotic art and sensational stories. The 
novel is almost an anti-romantic tract.
Despite the fact that it is generally agreed to be one of the most finely crafted works to be created in the 19th 
century, it would probably never have had the impact it did if Madame Bovary had not also been the subject of a 
sensational obscenity trial. So restrained were the standards of polite fiction in mid-19th-century France that many 
modern readers go right past the big \"sex scenes\" which got Flaubert into trouble without noticing them (hints: 
look for Rodolphe to smoke while working on his harness just after making love with Emma for the first time while 
she experiences the afterglow, and for Emma to toss torn-up pieces of a note out of her carriage during her 
lovemaking with Léon). However, they were enough to outrage the defenders of middle-class morality. The 
prosecution was particularly indignant that Emma did not seem to suffer for her sins. Flaubert’s clever lawyer 
successfully argued that her grotesquely described death made the novel into a moral tale; but the fact is that she 
dies not because she is an adultress but because she is a shopaholic.
It is not only the literary style of Madame Bovary that is anti-Romantic, it is its subject as well. The narrative clearly 
portrays Emma as deluded for trying to model her life after the Romantic fiction she loves. The novel is a sort of 
anti-Romantic manifesto, and its notoriety spread its message far and wide. It is worth noting, however, that 
Flaubert returned to Romanticism from time to time in his career, for instance in Salammbô, a colorful historical 
novel set in ancient Carthage.
If there are moral facts, how can we know them? For a realist, moral facts are as certain as mathematical facts. 
Moral facts and mathematical facts are abstract entities, and as such, are different in kind from natural facts. One 
cannot literally display moral facts as one could display, say, a plant. One can display a token of the type, for 
example one can write \"lying for personal gain is wrong\" or one can write an equation; however, one cannot 
observe moral and mathematical facts in quite the same way as one can observe, with the aid of a microscope, 
clorophyll in a leaf. Such limitations of experience do not stop realists and antirealists from disagreeing on virtually 
every aspect of the moral practices that seem to presuppose the existence of moral facts. The list of contested areas 
includes moral language, moral truth, moral knowledge, moral objectivity, moral psychology, and so on. These 
areas are not discrete but intermingle.
The moral realist may argue for the view that there are moral facts as follows:
(1) Moral sentences are sometimes true.
(2) A sentence is true only if the truth-making relation holds between it and the thing that makes it true.
(3) Thus, true moral sentences are true only because there holds the truth-making relation between them and the 
things that make them true.
Therefore,
(4) The things that make some moral sentences true must exist.
It is a short inference from the existence of the things that make some moral sentences true to the existence of moral 
facts.
The moral antirealist can respond to the argument by denying any of the three premises. The antirealist could be a 
non-descriptivist in rejecting premise (1): no moral sentences are true for they do not describe how the world is; or, 
she may reject a version of the correspondence theory of truth by denying premise (2): she may argue that a sentence 
can be true even if there holds no truth-making relation between it and the thing that makes it true. For instance, she 
may be a proponent of the coherence theory of truth, which holds that a sentence can be true only when there is a 
truth making relation between it and other sentences relevant to it. Or, she may even reject as illegitimate the 
inference from \"things that make some moral sentences true\" to the \"existence of moral facts.\"
In the past, many antirealists were noncognitivists, holding that moral judgments are not cognitive states like 
ordinary beliefs: that is, antirealists hold that unlike beliefs, the essential function or aim of moral judgments is not 
to represent the world accurately. (A non-descriptivist claim is that cognitivism —more specifically descriptivism— 
is necessary, but not sufficient for moral realism, as will be shown presently.) Moral judgments are, according to the 
noncognitivist, mental states of some other kind: they are emotions, desires, or intentions of the sort that are 
expressed by commands or prescriptions.
If moral judgments are expressed by commands or prescriptions, then there cannot be literal moral truths. (Cf. 
Wright 1993. He argues that the focal discussion in the realist/antirealist debate should be about the acceptable 
theories of truth.) If there are no literal moral truths, then no moral judgments may be cited as evidence for knowing 
how the world is. Moral knowledge can no longer be considered as descriptive or propositional; or, no one is 
justified in believing certain things about the world in making moral judgments. This illustrates how the 
noncognitivist analysis of moral judgments can be escalated into the antirealist rejection of (those good names that 
we take for granted when we participate in moral practices such as) \"moral truths\" and \"moral knowledge.\" The 
antirealist’s noncognitivism threatens moral objectivity as well. Objectivity is to be found within the world. If moral 
judgments are not about accurately describing the world —for example, if moral judgments are about us —then 
moral objectivity will not be found within the world. If moral objectivity is to be found within us, then it is not the 
same objectivity with which we began, or, so had been the old antirealist’s way.
According to a platonic realist, directions exist and have a nature which is independent of anyone’s beliefs, 
linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on. But doesn’t the availability of (A), (B), and (C) undermine the 
existence claim at the heart of platonic realism? After all, (A), (B), and (C) allow us to paraphrase any sentence 
whose truth appears to entail the existence of abstract objects into a sentence whose truth involves only the existence 
of concrete inscriptions. Doesn’t this show that an analytic reduction can aid someone wishing to question the 
existence claim involved in a particular form of realism? There is a powerful argument, first developed by William 
Alston (1958), and convincingly resuscitated by Crispin Wright (1983, Ch.1), that suggests not. The analytic 
reductionist who wishes to wield the contextual definitions against the existence claim at the heart of platonic 
realism takes them to show that the apparent reference to abstract objects on the left-hand sides of the definitions is 
merely apparent: in fact, the truth of the relevant sentences entails only the existence of a range of concrete 
inscriptions. But the platonic realist can retort: what the contextual definitions show is that the apparent lack of 
reference to abstract objects on the right-hand sides is merely apparent. In fact, the platonic realist can say, the truth 
of the sentences figuring on the right-hand sides implicitly involves reference to abstract objects. If there is no way 
to break this deadlock the existence of the analytic reductive paraphrases will leave the existence claim at the heart 
of the relevant form of realism untouched. So the issue of this style of reductionism appears to be orthogonal to 
debates between realists and non-realists.
Can the same be said about non-analytic styles of reductionism? Again, there is no straightforward connection 
between the issue of reductionism and the issue of realism. The problem is that, to borrow some terminology and 
examples from Railton 1989, some reductions will be vindicative whilst others will be eliminativist. For example, 
the reduction of water to H20 is vindicative: it vindicates our belief that there is such a thing as water, rather than 
overturning it. On the other hand:
… the reduction of ‘polywater’—a peculiar form of water thought to have been observed in laboratories in the 1960s
—to ordinary-water-containing-some-impurities-from-improperly-washed-glassware contributed to the conclusion 
that there really is no such substance as polywater (1989: 161).
Thus, a non-analytic reduction may or may not have implications for the existence dimension of a realistic view of a 
particular subject matter. And even if the existence dimension is vindicated, there is still the further question 
whether the objects and properties vindicated are independent of anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices, and so on. 
Again, there is no straightforward relationship between the issue of reductionism and the issue of realism.
Views Opposing the Existence Dimension (III): Expressivism about 
Morals
We saw above that for the subject-matter in question the error-theorist agrees with the realist that the truth of the 
atomic, declarative sentences of that area requires the existence of the relevant type of objects, or the instantiation of 
the relevant sorts of properties. Although the realist and the error-theorist agree on this much, they of course 
disagree on the question of whether the relevant type of objects exist, or on whether the relevant sorts of properties 
are instantiated: the error-theorist claims that they don’t, so that the atomic, declarative sentences of the area are 
systematically and uniformly false, the realist claims that at least in some instances the relevant objects exist or the 
relevant properties are instantiated, so that the atomic, declarative sentences of the area are at least in some instances 
true. We also saw that an error-theory about a particular area could be motivated by epistemological worries (Field) 
or by a combination of epistemological and metaphysical worries (Mackie).
Another way in which the existence dimension of realism can be resisted is via expressivism. Whereas the realist 
and the error-theorist agree that the sentences of the relevant area are truth-apt, apt to be assessed in terms of truth 
and falsity, the realist and the expressivist (alternatively non-cognitivist, projectivist) disagree about the truth-
aptness of those sentences. It is a fact about English that sentences in the declarative mood (‘The beer is in the 
fridge’) are conventionally used for making assertions, and assertions are true or false depending on whether or not 
the fact that is asserted to obtain actually obtains. But there are other grammatical moods that are conventionally 
associated with different types of speech-act. For example, sentences in the imperatival mood (‘Put the beer in the 
fridge’) are conventionally used for giving orders, and sentences in the interrogative mood (‘Is the beer in the 
fridge?’) are conventionally used for asking questions. Note that we would not ordinarily think of orders or 
questions as even apt for assessment in terms of truth and falsity: they are not truth-apt. Now the conventions 
mentioned here are not exceptionless: for example, one can use sentences in the declarative mood (‘My favourite 
drink is Belhaven 60 shilling’) to give an order (for some Belhaven 60 shilling), one can use sentences in the 
interrogative mood (‘Is the Pope a Catholic?’) to make an assertion (of whatever fact was the subject of the 
discussion), and so on. The expressivist about a particular area will claim that the realist is misled by the syntax of 
the sentences of that area into thinking that they are truth-apt: she will say that this is a case where the conventional 
association of the declarative mood with assertoric force breaks down. In the moral case the expressivist can claim 
that ‘Stealing is wrong’ is no more truth-apt than ‘Put the beer in the fridge’: it is just that the lack of truth-aptness 
of the latter is worn on its sleeve, while the lack of truth-aptness of the former is veiled by its surface syntax.(There 
are some very important issues concerning the relationship between minimalism about truth-aptitude and 
expressivism that we cannot go into here. See Divers and Miller (1995)and Miller (2013b) for some pointers. There 
are also some important differences between e.g. Ayer’s emotivism and more modern forms of expressivism (such 
as those developed by Blackburn and Gibbard) that we gloss over here. For a useful account, see Schroeder 2009). 
So, if moral sentences are not conventionally used for the making of assertions, what are they conventionally used 
for? According to one classical form of expressivism, emotivism, they are conventionally used for the expression of 
emotion, feeling, or sentiment. Thus, A.J. Ayer writes:
If I say to someone, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’, I am not stating anything more than if I had simply 
said, ‘You stole that money’. In adding that this action is wrong, I am not making any further statement about it. I 
am simply evincing my moral disapproval about it. It is as if I had said, ‘You stole that money’, in a peculiar tone of 
horror, or written with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds 
nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain 
feelings in the speaker (Ayer 1946: 107, emphases added).
It follows from this that:
If I now generalise my previous statement and say, ‘Stealing money is wrong,’ I produce a sentence which has no 
factual meaning—that is, expresses no proposition that can be either true or false (1946: 107).
Emotivism faces many problems, discussion of which is not possible here (for a survey, see Miller 2003a Ch.3). 
One problem that has been the bugbear of all expressivist versions of non-realism, the ‘Frege-Geach Problem’, is so-
called because the classic modern formulation is by Peter Geach (1965), who attributes the original point to Frege.
According to emotivism, when I sincerely utter the sentence ‘Murder is wrong’ I am not expressing a belief or 
making an assertion, but rather expressing some non-cognitive sentiment or feeling, incapable of being true or false. 
Thus, the emotivist claims that in contexts where ‘is wrong’ is being applied to an action-type it is being used to 
express a sentiment or feeling of disapproval towards actions of that type. But what about contexts in which it is not 
being applied to an action type? An example of such a sentence would be ‘If murder is wrong, then getting little 
brother to murder people is wrong’. In the antecedent of this ‘is wrong’ is clearly not being applied to anything 
(compare: in uttering ‘If snow is black then it is not white’ I am not applying ‘is black’ to snow). So what account 
can the emotivist give of the use of ‘Murder is wrong’ within ‘unasserted contexts’, such as the antecedent of the 
conditional above? Since it is not there used to express disapproval of murder, the account of its semantic function 
must be different from that given for the apparently straightforward assertion expressed by ‘Murder is wrong’. But 
now there is a problem in accounting for the following valid inference:
1. Murder is wrong.
2. If Murder is wrong, then getting your little brother to murder people is wrong.
Therefore:
1. Getting your little brother to murder people is wrong.
If the semantic function of ‘is wrong’ as it occurs within an asserted context in (1) is different from its semantic 
function as it occurs within an unasserted context in (2), isn’t someone arguing in this way simply guilty of 
equivocation? In order for the argument to be valid, the occurrence of ‘Murder is wrong’ in (1) has to mean the same 
thing as the occurrence of ‘Murder is wrong’ in (2). But if ‘is wrong’ has a different semantic function in (1) and (2), 
then it certainly doesn’t mean the same thing in (1) and (2), and so neither do the sentences in which it appears. So 
the above argument is apparently no more valid than:
1. My beer has a head on it.
2. If my beer has a head on it, then it must have eyes and ears.
Therefore:
1. My beer must have eyes and ears.
This argument is obviously invalid, because it relies on an equivocation on two senses of ‘head’, in (4) and (5) 
respectively.
It is perhaps worth stressing why the Frege-Geach problem doesn’t afflict ethical theories which see ‘Murder is 
wrong’ as truth-apt, and sincere utterances of ‘Murder is wrong’ as capable of expressing straightforwardly truth-
assessable beliefs. According to theories like these, moral modus ponens arguments such as the argument above 
from (1) and (2) to (3) are just like non-moral cases of modus ponens such as
1. Smith is in Glasgow;
2. If Smith is in Glasgow then Smith is in Scotland;
Therefore,
1. Smith is in Scotland.
Why is this non-moral case of modus ponensnot similarly invalid in virtue of the fact that ‘Smith is in Glasgow’ is 
asserted in (7), but not in (8)? The answer is of course that the state of affairs asserted to obtain by ‘Smith is in 
Glasgow’ in (7) is the same as that whose obtaining is merely entertained in the antecedent of (8). In (7) ‘Smith is in 
Glasgow’ is used to assert that a state of affairs obtains (Smith’s being in Glasgow), and in (8) it is asserted that if 
that state of affairs obtains, so does another (Smith’s being in Scotland). Throughout, the semantic function of the 
sentences concerned is given in terms of the states of affairs asserted to obtain in simple assertoric contexts. And it 
is difficult to see how an emotivist can say anything analogous to this with respect to the argument from (1) and (2) 
to (3): it is difficult to see how the semantic function of ‘Murder is wrong’ in the antecedent of (2) could be given in 
terms of the sentiment it allegedly expresses in (1).
The Frege-Geach challenge to the emotivist is thus to answer the following question: how can you give an emotivist 
account of the occurrence of moral sentences in ‘unasserted contexts’—such as the antecedents of conditionals—
without jeopardising the intuitively valid patterns of inference in which those sentences figure? Philosophers 
wishing to develop an expressivistic alternative to moral realism have expended a great deal of energy and ingenuity 
in devising responses to this challenge. See in particular Blackburn’s development of ‘quasi-realism’, in his (1984) 
Chs 5 and 6, (1993) Ch.10, (1998) Ch.3 and Gibbard’s ‘norm-expressivism’, in his (1990) Ch.5, and further refined 
in his (2003). For criticism see Hale (1993) and (2002), and Kölbel (2002) Ch.4. For an overview, see Schroeder 
(2008) and Miller (2013a), Chs 4 and 5. For very useful surveys of recent work on expressivism, see Schroeder 
(2009) and Sinclair (2009).
Plato's solution is that universals do indeed exist, although not in the same way that ordinary 
physical objects exist, but in a sort of ghostly mode of existence, outside of space and time, but 
not at any spatial or temporal distance from people's bodies. Thus, people cannot see or otherwise come into 
sensory contact with universals, and it is meaningless to apply the categories of space and time to 
them, but they can nevertheless be conceived of and exist.
One type of universal defined by Plato is the Form, which is not a mental entity at all, but rather an idea or 
archetype or original model of which particular objects, properties and relations are copies. The \"forms\" (small 
\"f\") or appearances that we see, according to Plato, are not real, but literally mimic the real \"Forms\" (capital 
\"F\"). Forms are capable of being instantiated by one or many different particulars, which are essentially material 
copies of the Forms - the particulars are said to \"participate\" in the Forms, and the Forms are said to \"inhere\" 
in the particulars. 
According to Plato, Platonic Forms possess the highestand most fundamental kind of reality. They are 
perfectbecause they are unchanging. The world of Forms is separate from our own world (the world of 
substances) and is the truebasis of reality. Removed from matter, Forms are the most pure of all things. True 
knowledge or intelligenceis the ability to grasp the world of Forms with one's mind.
Plato's main evidence for the existence of Forms is intuitive only, arguing from human perception (a 
generalization which applies equally to objects which are clearly different e.g. blue sky and blue cloth), and from 
perfection (a perfect model for various imperfect copies, which are different but recognizably copies of the same 
thing e.g. flawed circles must be imperfect copies of the same thing).
Plato himself was well aware of the limitations of his theory, and in particular concocted the \"Third Man 
Argument\" against his own theory: if a Form and a particular are alike, then there must be another(third) thing by 
possession of which they are alike, leading to an infinite regression. In a later (rather unsatisfactory) version of the 
theory, he tried to circumvent this objection by positing that particulars do not actually exist as such: they 
\"mime\" the Forms, merely appearing to be particulars.
Aristotle points out that proof of Forms and universals rests on prior knowledge: if we did not know what 
universals were in the first place, we would have no idea of what we were trying to prove, and so could not be 
trying to prove it. He also asserted that universals and particulars imply each other: one is logically prioror 
posterior to the other and, if they are to be regarded as distinct, then they cannot be \"universal\" and 
\"particulars\".
Other critics have argued that Forms, not being spatial, cannot have a shape, so it cannot be that a particular of, say, 
an apple is the same shape as the Form of an apple. They have also questioned how one can have the concept of a 
Form existing in some special realm of the universe, apartfrom space and time, since such a concept cannot come 
from sense-perception.
Modal Realism is the view, notably propounded by David Lewis (1941 - 2001), that possible worlds are just as 
real as the actual world we live in, and not just abstract possibilities. The term goes back to Gottfried Leibniz's 
theory of possible worlds, which he used to analyze modal notions of necessityand possibility.
Lewis claimed that:
• Possible worlds exist: they are just as real as our world.
• Possible worlds are the same sort of things as our world: they differ in content, not in kind.
• Possible worlds cannot be reduced to something more basic: they are irreducible entities in their own right.
• When we talk of our \"actual\" world, the term \"actual\" is indexical (merely indicating some particular 
state of affairs): it does not mean that our world is any more real than any other.
• Possible worlds are spatio-temporally isolated from each other: they do not exist in the same space or time.
• Possible worlds are causally isolated from each other: they do not interact with each other.
Lewis himself raises several lines of argument againstthe theory, and then proceeds to counter them, and it has 
proven to be remarkably resilient, despite its apparent affront to common sense.
Moral Realism (or Moral Objectivism) is the meta-ethical view (see the section on Ethics) that there are 
objective moral valueswhich are independent of our perception of them or our stance towards them. Therefore, 
moral judgmentsdescribe moral facts. It is a cognitivist view (cognitivism being the view that ethical sentences 
express propositions and are therefore \"truth-apt\" i.e. they are able to be true or false), and it contrasts with 
expressivist or non-cognitivist theories of moral judgment, error theories, fictionalist theories and constructivist 
or relativisttheories.
Plato and (arguably) Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx were moral realists, as well as more contemporary philosophers 
such as G. E. Moore and Ayn Rand (1905 - 1982).
Moral Realism purportedly allows the ordinary rules of logic to be applied straightforwardly to moral statements. It 
also allows for the resolution of moral disagreements, because if two moral beliefs contradict one another, Moral 
Realism (unlike some other meta-ethical systems) says that they cannot both be right and so there should be some 
way of resolving the situation.
Critics have argued that, while Moral Realism may be able to explain how to resolve moral conflicts, it cannot 
explain how these conflicts arose in the first place. Others have argued Moral Realism posits a kind of \"moral fact\" 
which is non-material and unobservableand therefore not accessible to the scientific method.
